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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(5), Utah
Code Ann. (1996) and Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This case presents the question of whether the Utah Court of Appeals correctly
adopted the rule in Federated Dept. Stores v. Moitie! to govern determinations of issues
where the law has changed but a party failed to appeal.
Standard of Review
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of
Appeals, not that of the trial court.2

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its reliance

on a case for its decision is a question of law. The Utah Supreme Court reviews the
Court of Appeals's conclusions of law for correctness and affords them no deference.3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioners4 own three homes in residential neighborhoods in Sandy City. At
various times in the period prior to 1996 they claim to have rented these properties for
periods of less than 30 days, which are referred to herein as "short-term" or "ski" rentals.
1

452 U.S. 394, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981)

2

Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2; see Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, H 15,
7 P.3d 783 (Utah)

3

Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc., 2001 UT 32, f 23, 23 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Utah)

4

Herein called "Property Owners", "Owners", or the "Collinses."
1

Sandy City ordinances prohibit such uses. The Property Owners appealed a
determination by the City's zoning administrator to the Board of Adjustment in 1996 on
the issue of whether the City's ordinances prohibited short-term rentals or "ski" rentals
(because the homes were allegedly rented for periods of a week at a time to skiers). The
Board of Adjustment and District Court ruled in favor of the City. After the Collinses
failed to appeal from the adverse district court decision, the Court of Appeals ruled
against the City's position in another ski rental case, presenting the same issue, Brown et
al v. Sandy City Board ofAdjustment5

Pursuant to Brown, the City adopted an

ordinance specifically prohibiting short-term rentals of less than 30 days.
The Owners then returned to the Sandy Board of Adjustment claiming that the
intervening Brown decision entitled them to rent three of their properties6 as short-term
rentals. The City informed them that they still needed to prove that they were entitled to
a nonconforming use, or that the properties were "grandfathered." The Sandy City
Board of Adjustment and the district court ruled that the Owners failed to show that they
qualified as nonconforming uses, and further, that because a nonconforming use of
property must be legal when it commences, the Owners were collaterally estopped by the

5

957P.2d207(1998)

6

A fourth property, which was the subject of the previous litigation begun in 1996, is no
longer an issue before the court, since the Owners apparently no longer own it: the 1456
E. Longdale Drive home.
2

decision of the 1996 case from bringing the matter a second time. The Owners appealed
that decision to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in favor of the City.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On March 26,1996, a Sandy City zoning code enforcement officer, Nolan
Isom, sent a Notice and Order to the property owner, John Collins, directing him to stop
operating three homes as transitory lodging facilities in violation of Sandy ordinances.7
2. The Property Owners filed an appeal to the Sandy City Board of Adjustment
from the determination of the City that the use of the three properties as short-term rental
units was prohibited by the Sandy City Development Code. They also included in their
appeal an additional property which had not been the subject of the cease and desist
order, the property at 9255 South Maison Drive.8
3. At the Board of Adjustment hearing, held August 8,1996, eleven residents
from the neighborhoods where the homes were located, testified as to various
complaints about the use of the Collinses' properties as "ski rentals".9 After hearing the
7

The subject properties were single family dwellings located at 1875 East Alia Panna
Way, 1456 E. Longdate Drive, and 472 East 9400 South, in Sandy, Utah in residential
zoning districts A copy of the Notice and Order is attached hereto as Tab No. 1.
8

R. at 156. The record before the Board of Adjustment in 1996 contains no mention of
the fact that the 9255 South Maison Drive property had not actually been the subject of
the cease and desist order, which was apparently overlooked by the Board in its decision,
whi-jh thus applied to that property as well.
9

Among the complaints expressed about the plaintiffs' use of their properties at the
August 1996 Board of Adjustment hearing were the following:
(a) Poor upkeep (Aug. 8, 1996 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 11, R. at 273);
3

evidence and arguments from the residents and the Owners, the Board of Adjustment
ruled that the City's interpretation of its ordinances was correct and denied the appeal.10
4. Owners filed a complaint with the Third District Court appealing the decision
of the Sandy Board of Adjustment. The properties listed in the Amended Complaint11
omitted the property at 9255 South Maison Drive.
5. The district court, Judge Frank G. Noel, granted the City's motion for

(b) Failure to shovel snow off of sidewalks, in one case for four weeks (1997 Bd
of Adj. Minutes at p. 12, R. at 274) about which Mr. Collins responded that if tenants
wish, they can shovel snow, and that tenants do shovel snow {Id. at 9);
(c) Short-term rentals will lower the property values of the neighborhood {Id. at
10,11) (R. at 273);
(d) Traffic problems {Id. at 11), and a fear for the safety of children (Minutes at p.
12, R. at 273);
(e) There was no on-site management of the guests at the rental homes as there
would be at a motel {Id. at 12, R. at 273);
(f) Partying and loud music on weekends late into the night at properties where
many beer cans were viewed {Id. at 11, 13R. at 273, 275);
(g) Not knowing whom to contact when there were complaints about the
properties {Id. at p. 13, R. at 276);
(h) As many as nine cars at one of the Owners' properties {Id. at 13, R. at 275),
although John Collins stated he limits the number of cars allowed in his rental agreements
{Id. at p. 9, R. at 271) to only two or three cars at any of the rental homes {Id. at P. 10, R.
at 272);
(i) Allowing one of the properties to be rented violated restrictive covenants
requiring that the buildings be used only for "a single family dwelling" for the subdivision
in which it sits, and that the plaintiffs were aware of these covenants, which was
supported by a letter signed by many of the residents and read at the hearing {Id. at p. 11,
R. at 273).
A copy of the minutes of that meeting are attached hereto as Tab no 2.
10

1996 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 14, Tab 2 R. at 276. Findings of fact and conclusions
were not adopted by the Board in that proceeding.
11

Amended Complaint, R. at 174.
4

summary judgment and denied Owners' motion for summary judgment.12 The Owners
did not appeal the court's decision.13
6. On March 26,1998, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion in another
case involving short-term rentals in Sandy, Brown et al v. Sandy City Board of
Adjustment}* In that case the court held that Sandy City's zoning ordinances did not
prohibit rentals of less than 30 days in residential districts, but that the City could
prohibit such uses if the it adopted an ordinance specifically forbidding them. The City's
petition for certiorari to this court was denied.
7. The Sandy City Council thereupon adopted an ordinance prohibiting shortterm rentals of 30 days or less in all residential districts in Sandy.15
8. Owners sought to avoid the new ordinance by filing an application for
nonconforming use status with the Sandy City Board of Adjustment on October 27,
1998. This application was for three properties located at the following addresses: 1875
East Alia Panna Way, 472 East 9400 South, and 9255 South Maison Drive.16

12

Revised Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal, R. at 210.

13

See November 12, 1998 Bd. of Adj. Minutes at 3, Tab 7 ; see also Brief of Appellants
at 11
14

957 P.2d 207

15

R. at 214, 219, 224.

16

Record at 132. The property at 1456 E. Longdate Drive was not brought to the
Board of Adjustment or subsequently to the district court, apparently because Owners
had sold the home.
5

9. On November 12, 1998 the Sandy City Board of Adjustment held a hearing on
the application for nonconforming use status. The Board denied Owners' request for
nonconforming use status, finding (1) that the Owners had not used the properties as
short-term rentals on the effective date of the new ordinance prohibiting short-term
rentals17, and (2) that the decision in Brown did not apply to the Owners inasmuch as
they had not appealed the earlier decision of the district court.18 No evidence was
submitted at the hearing on the Owners' nonconforming use as "ski" rentals, e.g., credit
card or other receipts, correspondence with renters, purchase price of the properties,
improvements made in preparation of their new use, advertizing, income or motel taxes
paid.
10. The Owners petitioned the district court for a review of the decision of the
Board of Adjustment. On August 16,1999, the court held a hearing on the parties' cross
motions for summary judgment, and on November 18,1999, Judge Timothy R. Hanson
granted summary judgment for the City on both the nonconforming use and the collateral
estoppel issues.19

17

No evidence was submitted by the Owners to show that they were using the properties
for short-term rentals when the new ordinance went into effect in 1998. Para. 11, Sandy
Bd. of Adj. Findings of Fact and Conclusions, R. at 240.
18

R. at 240.

19

R. at 446
6

11. On appeal from the district court, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the
district court decision on the nonconforming use and collateral estoppel issues,20 from
which this court has granted certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The Collinses improperly raise a new issue for the first time before this court.
The Collinses improperly raise an argument for the first time on certiorari to this court,21
the argument that the issue preclusion applies against the City in this case because the
City lost the case of Brown et al. v. Sandy City Board ofAdjustment, in what is called
nonmutual collateral estoppel. They cite no valid authority for their argument, nor has
the applicability of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel been decided in Utah, nor has
the use of nonmutual collateral estoppel against a City been decided.
II. Collinses' Arguments Attacking Moitie Are Unsound. The Court of
Appeals in its decision below, relied in part upon Federated Dept. Stores v. Moitie , 452
U.S. 394,101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981). The efforts of the Property Owners
attempting to differentiate Moitiefromthis case on factual grounds do not hold up.
III. Issue preclusion should apply here under the Rest. 2d Judgments §28(2)
balancing test. Courts have stated strong interests in precluding relitigation of cases
20

Collins v. Sandy City Board ofAdjustment, 2000 UT 371, 16 P.3d 1251

21

See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995) ("Issues not raised in the court of
appeals may not be raised on certiorari unless the issue arose for the first time out
of the court of appeals1 decision."); see also Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service
Commission, 917 P.2d 1082 (1996).
7

which have once been decided on the merits. Even if the Court of Appeals erred in
relying on Moitie and other claims preclusion cases for its decision, issue preclusion is
still appropriate to apply in this case. The Property Owners argue that where there is an
intervening appellate decision between the first and second cases which changes the law,
issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, should not preclude relitigation of the issue,
citing Cassidy v. Board of Education22 and Restatement (Second) Judgments §28(2).
In collateral estoppel cases where there has been a substantial change of law
between the first and second cases, the Restatement and other authorities call for a
balancing of the interests in repose against the interest in continuing the second lawsuit.
The property interests in reliance and repose of the City's citizens, and particularly the
homeowners in the neighborhoods where these three ski rental homes were used, who
might now be affected by the rental of these homes from week to week by reopening the
issue, outweighs the any interest of the Owners in being treated like other ski owners
who won the Brown case. The interests of the neighbors are all the more compelling
here because the Owners made a deliberate choice not to appeal the first Board of
Adjustment decision and district court judgment in this case. The balancing of interests
therefore favors the City in this case, and issue preclusion should be applied.
In any event, the Collinses failed to submit any evidence of their nonconforming
use to the Sandy City Board of Adjustment when they came before it the second time.

22

316 Md. 50, 557 A.2d 227 (Md. App. 1989).
8

Their appeal would therefore fail even if this court corrects the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COLLINSES MAY NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF NONMUTUAL
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE CITY AT THIS STAGE
Besides to its being outside the scope of the issue before the court, the Collinses
improperly raise the argument that collateral estoppel prevents the City from its position
in this action for the first time in their brief to this court.23 Offensive use of collateral
estoppel is generally inappropriate where a party could easily have joined in the litigation
it seeks to benefit from by use of the case.24 The Collinses could have appealed the
district court judgment in the first case in this matter, and then have moved for
consolidation with Brown, et al. in the appeal on the ski rental issue to the Court of
Appeals, thereby avoiding the waste of resources involved in this litigation. Instead, they
chose to sit back and wait to see what happened in the Brown case, and now seek to use
it to their advantage. Such nonmutual offensive use of collateral estoppel tends to

23

See DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995) ("Issues not raised in the court of
appeals may not be raised on certiorari unless the issue arose for the first time out of the
court of appeals' decision.").

24

see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552
(1979)
9

increase litigation, unlike defensive use of collateral estoppel, which tends to reduce
litigation, one of the reasons it is disfavored.25
The Property Owners rely on Hill v. Seattle First Nat Bank,26 but that case does
not support their assertion of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel against the City, a
doctrine without precedent in Utah.27
II. THE ARGUMENTS ATTACKING MOITIE ARE UNSOUND.
The Collinses argue that the Court of Appeals erred in relying upon Moitie for its
decision applying issue preclusion to their second case. They attempt to distinguish
Moitie from the present case on several grounds. First, these Property Owners argue that
in Moitie, the precluded parties in that federal antitrust case (plaintiffs Moitie and
Brown) were original parties to the decision that resulted in the reversal of the law,
whereas in this case, the Collinses were not parties to the suit which changed the law in
Brown.28 In fact, Moitie, Brown, and the other original plaintiffs against Federated
Department Stores, the defendant, each brought separate suits which were all assigned to
the same federal judge and dismissed at the same time, but were never, apparently,

25

See id.

26

827P.2d241 (Utah 1992)

27

See Utah v. Clinton Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992), footnote 3, J. Zimmerman
dissenting. Hill v. Seattle First Nat Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992), an opinion by J.
Zimmerman, was a defensive use of collateral estoppel.
28

Collinses'Brief at 8.
10

consolidated into a single case. This factual distinction is thus without foundation.
The Collinses also argue that the cases are different because in Moitie, the original
plaintiffs were "forum shopping."29 Why this should be significant is not explained, if it
was the case,30 nor is it discernable.
The Collinses also distinguish Moitie from the present case on the ground that the
change in law in Moitie was entirely unanticipated, whereas in the first Collins v. Sandy
City case, the appeal by Brown was a fully prepared appeal pending before the Utah
Court of Appeals when the Collinses elected not to appeal the adverse district court
judgment. Collinses' Brief at 7. This distinction is of little consequence since any
appeal to an appellate court has the potential of creating a change in law. Surely the
parties bringing the appeal in the Moitie case anticipated a change in law; otherwise, they
would not likely have gone to the trouble of appealing. To distinguish appellate cases on
the basis of which would result in a change in the law can only be practiced in hindsight.
Snyder v. Newcomb Oil Co, Inc.,31 relied on by the Collinses, is not on point since
that case involved claim preclusion and an intervening legislative change, rather than a

29

Collinses'Brief at 8.

30

Moitie, one of the two plaintiffs in the original action in the Supreme Court case, did
file its original action against Federated in state court; Brown, the other, filed in federal
district court. After removal of Moitie's case to the federal district court, and dismissal,
both parties filed in a single suit in state court which Federated again removed to federal
district court, where it was dismissed.
31

603 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1993)
11

change in court precedent, as here. Likewise, Foley v. Roche,32 also cited in the brief of
the Collinses, was a case involving overruling the law of the case rather than issue
preclusion.
Moitie, cited as support by the Court of Appeals in its decision, while a claims
preclusion, and not an issue preclusion case, is nonetheless important for the general rule
that courts are unwilling to allow a party to relitigate a case after foregoing an
opportunity to appeal in the first instance. Although the context is somewhat different
here, the need for finality in judgements is nonetheless an important consideration in this
matter.
III.

EVEN IF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS IN ERROR IN
RELYING ONMOITIE, ISSUE PRECLUSION SHOULD STILL
APPLY HERE.
A. Courts favor repose and finality of judgments in reducing
redundant litigation
Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court said that the object for which

civil courts have been established in our society is to secure the peace and repose of the
community by the settlement of matters which can be determined by judicial
administration, and that the enforcement of judgments is essential to the maintenance of
social order.33 But for such enforcement, the assistance of the courts would not be

2

447 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div. 1982)

33

Southern Pacific R.R. v. U.S., 168 U.S. 1,48,18 S.Ct. 18, 27,42 L.Ed. 355 (1897)
12

sought in resolving disputes.34 One of the central objectives of our modern system of
civil procedure is putting an end to litigation by according finality to judgments.35 The
established rule is that preclusion cannot be defeated by electing to forgo an available
opportunity to appeal.36 Once the time for appeal has run, a judgment is res judicata
without regard to the fact that an appeal might have been taken to a higher court.37
Both branches of res judicata, claims preclusion, and issue preclusion, serve the
important judicial purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating the same
issue with the same party or his privy.38 They serve the additional benefit of promoting
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation/9
The Owners argue that application of issue preclusion is unfair inasmuch as they
are "being penalized for pursuing their legal remedy."40 But it is their decision not to
pursue their legal remedy when they could have which created this second unnecessary
34

Id.

35

Marcus, Redish, Sherman, Civil Procedure: A Modern Approach (2nd ed.) at 1091 Each
branch promotes the important judicial policy of preventing parties from relitigating a
claim or issue.
36

Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Appeals Foregone,
Pending or Unavailable §4433 at 305.
37

Id.

38

Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983)

39

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
328-329 (1971)

40

Collinses'brief at 9.
13

suit. Their failure to appeal the earlier decision of the Board of Adjustment41 and the
district court judgment was unjustified where there was no decision in Utah on the issue
being tried, notwithstanding that other property owners had appealed in the Brown, et al.
v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment case.42 The Owners argue that their failure to appeal
was in the interest of judicial economy. An appeal to the Court of Appeals and a motion
to consolidate their case with the appellants in Brown, however, would have served that
interest, and these Owners would have also preserved their legal position, thereby
avoiding the wastefulness and redundancy of this second lawsuit.
The Owners' position also overlooks the effect that such a change would have on
those who have relied upon the Board of Adjustment and district court decisions at
earlier stages on these properties: the many homeowners who expressed such opposition
and concern about these motel-like commercial uses in their neighborhoods, with
different renters coming and going from week to week. Those neighborhood owners

41

The Maison Drive property was not listed in the appeal to the district court in the
Amended Complaint, R. at 174. The Board of Adjustment decision therefore became
final when the Owners did not appeal to the decision on the legality of the short-term
rentals as to that property to the Third District Court. §10-9-708(3), Utah Code Ann.
(1999) (petition for district court review is barred unless filed within 30 days after the
Board of Adjustment decision.)
42

This case differs from most change of law by court decision cases in this respect.
There was no settled rule in Utah before the Brown decision on whether a city's
ordinances could prohibit a zoning use by exception. The decision of these Property
Owners not to appeal was therefore not done in reliance upon anything other than the
district court determination. If they felt that this ruling was wrong, they should have
sought to correct it appeal.
14

may have relied upon the decision of the Board and the judgment of the district court, but
for which they might have sold their homes and moved away to other neighborhoods.
After the passage of time, the market conditions for such a sale may be less favorable. In
a similar position are those families which may have purchased homes near one of these
ski houses based on the earlier unappealed judgments. As Wright, Miller and Cooper say
on the problems of expanding the exceptions to res judicata based on intervening
changes of law or fact, "If issue preclusion is to mean anything, such reliance should be
protected."43
Property rights are one of the areas where the interests in reliance and repose are
particularly compelling, and where the protections of issue preclusion should be
maintained. When . . . title to real property is at issue, the need for finality is at its
apex."44

"Just as broad public interests may ease the way to reconsideration, so

important private interests of repose or reliance may require that preclusion apply despite
the clearest changes of the legal climate," citing, as examples, pension benefits won, and
title to property as deserving the same protection, id. at 263.45 Wright, et al., conclude

43

Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Issue Preclusion Questions of Law and Law Application §4425, at 252. This treatise may hereinafter be
referred to as 18 Wright § .
44

American Estate Management Corp. v. International Investment and Development
Corp., 986 P.2d 765 (Ut. App. 1999); See Farrell v. Brown, 729 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1986); 18 Wright, §4408, at 65 (1981).

45

18 Wright §4425 at 252.
15

by arguing for a balancing test where there has been a change of law, and where there are
offsetting interests in reliance and repose. "A balance must be struck between the clarity
of the change, special needs presented by specific areas of the law, and particularly
strong needs to preserve the values of preclusion."46
The Restatement (Second) Judgments also acknowledges the need for a balancing
between the importance of stability in the legal relationship between the immediate
parties and problems of disparate legal treatment.47
B. The balancing of interests here favors applying issue preclusion.
The balancing of interests for and against preclusion in this case must weigh on
one side of the scale the Owners'need for equal treatment with other similarly
situated owners, and on the other side, their calculated determination to forego an
available appeal on a point of law which had not been decided by any appellate court in
Utah, and the interests of families living in the neighborhoods affected by the Owners'
short-term rentals. These neighbors may have relied upon the unappealed judgment in
the earlier case. While the Owners declined to submit evidence on such issues as the

46

Mat264.

47

Rest. 2d Judgments §28 Comment c at 278. The reference therein to the legal
relationships between the "immediate parties" should apply to the City in this case, where
the City's enforcement of its ordinances is on behalf of the residents of the neighborhoods
where these short-term rentals occurred. See State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986)
(Individuals have an interest in being free from harm, and government has an obligation
to protect individuals who are otherwise defenseless.)
16

purchase price they paid for the homes which they turned into rental units or any
improvements they may have made to them, one can suppose that they paid a fair
residential market value for the properties and their subsequent sale or use as long-term
rentals, allowed by City ordinances, is a reasonable rate of return on those properties. A
balancing of these interests in this instance clearly favors the application of preclusion in
this case.48
The case ofMars land v. International Society ofKrishna Consciousness ,49 cited
in Cassidy v. Board of Education,50 relied on by the Collinses, is instructive in this
regard. The International Society of Krishna Consciousness (Society) leased a large
home in a residential zone in the city of Honolulu where it held religious services and
gatherings, and also had more than 30 people live, more than five of whom were
unrelated. The city brought a criminal case against the Society for violating its
ordinances prohibiting more than five unrelated individuals from living in a residence.
The Society defended in district court claiming they were a church, which is an allowed
use in a residential zone. Honolulu then brought an action for injunctive and declaratory
relief against the Society to prohibit it from continuing to use the home as a residence for
48

Although exceptions to collateral estoppel present less danger to interests of repose
and reliance than do exceptions to claims preclusion, see 18 Wright §4415, Esslinger v.
Baltimore City, 95 Md. App. 607, 622 A.2d 774 (Md.Sp.App. 1993), footnote 5, the
balancing is still required in issue preclusion cases as provided in the Rest. 2d and Wright.
49
50

66 Haw. 119, 657 P.2d 1035 (1983)
316Md.50,557A.2d227(1989)
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more than five unrelated persons. The Society raised collateral estoppel. The court,
applying Rest. 2d §28(2), determined that fairness to all others in the city required it to
refuse preclusion in this case. "In applying the doctrine of res judicata as [the Society]
would have us do, we wold be permitting it to continue to violate the ordinance without
fear of governmental sanctions while at the same time warning other parties that the same
ordinance would be enforced against them. This would be an absurd and unreasonable
application of the doctrine."51
In support of its decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court quoted the following
passage on the issue of whether a city can apply for an injunction even after an acquittal
of a criminal charge, " . . . [T]he rights of other property owners in the zoning district
where the violations occurred must necessarily be considered. Only by injunction could
these property rights be protected and the objectives of the ordinance promoted." 52 The
rights of the property owners in the affected neighborhoods in Sandy need this Court's
protection of their rights against similar intrusive property uses.
Of course, the Collinses may claim that Marsland only supports their argument
that even in a zoning case, collateral estoppel will be overridden. But the language of the
opinion suggests that the property interest of the larger community is preeminent.53

The

51

66 Haw. at 125

52

66 Haw. at 126, quoting City ofNew Orleans v. Lafon, 61 So.2d 270 (La. App. 1952)

53

The opinion cites other jurisdictions where similar decisions were reached in favor of
zoning ordinances when balanced against the interest of the private property owner in a
18

Collinses argue that they are unfairly treated because other property owners are allowed
to rent their homes as short-term rentals pursuant to the Brown decision, but they alone
are not. Marsland makes clear that it is not just the interest of the individual property
owner which is weighed in these equities. The entire community must follow the zoning
ordinances to make a city liveable.54
C. Cassidy is distinguishable from this case
The Property Owners cite Cassidy v. Board of Education55 in support of their
position.

In that case the plaintiffs' complaint for an assault and rape suffered on the

grounds of the public school was dismissed for a failure of proper notice to the school
board. The plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to litigate the case fully on its merits in

criminal issue preclusion context.
54

Where a party claims that the strict application of the zoning ordinances is
unreasonable, or unfair, such as in cases involving prior nonconforming uses, variances,
and special exceptions, zoning codes, including Sandy City's normally provide for a relief
valve through the board of adjustment. The purpose of the board of adjustment,
composed of members of the community familiar with its values, needs, and the zoning
ordinances, is to make these fact-intensive determinations in applying the zoning
ordinances. The Collinses, like others, had an opportunity to come before the Board and
present evidence showing that their properties qualified as nonconforming, but put on no
evidence in their support, and so the short-term rental use was not allowed. Of course,
they are still allowed to do long-term rentals.
55

316 Md. 50, 557 A.2d 227 (1989)
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the first instance because the case was dismissed before an answer was even filed;56
whereas the Collinses had a full opportunity to litigate.
Collateral estoppel applies when a case is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment.57 The reliance on an equitable remedy called for in
Restatement (Second) Judgments §28(2)(b)58 is appropriate in Cassidy, but here the
counterbalancing interests in repose are much stronger. The availability of appellate
review as a reassurance of the correctness of a lower court decision is a critical factor in
applying the preclusion doctrine59 and in the specific application of Rest. 2d Judgments
§28(2)(b).60 Where that appellate review was readily available and foregone, the need to

"As a general rule, dismissal for failure to satisfy a precondition is 'not an
adjudication on the merits that would bar assertion of the same claim after satisfying the
precondition..., but it should preclude relitigation of the same precondition issue.'"
Cassidy at 233.
57

Restatement (Second) Judgments §27

58

§28(2)(b) provides "Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the
issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following
circumstances:
"(2) The issue is one of law and . . . (b) a new determination is warranted in order to
take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to
avoid inequitable administration of the laws. . . "
59

See 18 Wright §4433at 315, Rest. Second of Judgments §28, comment a. See also 18
Wright §4434 at320, 321 (Application of issue preclusion does not depend on absence of
appeal alone, but on quality of the first tribunal, and special factors which explain the lack
of appellate review.)
60

Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F.Supp. 725, 741-742 (D.C.Md. 1977), remanded and
modified on other grounds 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979)
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review the decision again is greatly reduced, and weighs against the Owners in the
balancing of their interests. The property owners here have demonstrated no adverse
impact to the public generally of applying issue preclusion in this case, a significant
concern to courts in applying Rest. 2d §28(2)(b).61 On the contrary, as discussed above,
applying preclusion in this case is in the public interest inasmuch as it preserves the
health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood by supporting the zoning plan enacted by
the City.
CONCLUSION
The important role of preclusion in preventing the burden of relitigation of issues
already decided after a full and fair hearing on the merits, should not be set aside in this
case where the petitioners, the Collinses, elected to forego an available appeal. This, in
addition to the strong need for repose given the interests of property owners who may
have relied on the first judgment between these parties, and the public generally, favor
the application of issue preclusion here. If, in correcting the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the court determines that collateral estoppel should not apply in this situation,
the refusal of the Property Owners to present evidence supporting their application of
nonconforming use would in any event obviate the need for the expenditure of further
judicial resources on this case.

See Rutherfordv. California, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1267, 1284, 233 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1987)
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